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Abstract — Referring to the 18th century idealism of George Berkeley in which an object
exists if and only if it is observed, this note shows that orthodox quantum mechanics (OQM)
entails a Berkelian idealism regarding properties (BIRP): a quantum ‘has’ a property X with
quantitative value x if and only if the property X has just been measured with outcome x. It
is then impossible to recontextualize GR’s principle of curvature in any quantum framework
that implies this BIRP, for a quantum cannot curve space-time if it doesn’t have a definite
energy—which is supposed to be the cause of curvature—in absence of observation to begin
with. Concluding, it is ruled out that a quantum theory of gravity, in which GR’s principle of
curvature is built in as a fundamental physical principle, can be developed in any framework
implying this BIRP.
The famous dictum esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”), put forward by Berkeley
in his 1710 book Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, refers to the
idea that an object exists if and only if it is observed. Although this idea is nowadays
considered highly implausible—to say the least—the purpose of this short note is (i)
to show that a form of Berkelian idealism is entailed by orthodox quantum mechanics
(OQM), and (ii) to discuss how that poses an issue for the development of a quantum
theory of gravitation.
If we look at the ontology of ‘quanta’, then of course OQM does not deny that a
quantum exists in absence of observation. The State Postulate, namely, dictates that
the state of a quantum is represented by a wave function ψ with norm ‖ψ‖ = 1, and
the statistical interpretation of the latter means that OQM predicts with certainty that
the quantum will turn up somewhere if we look in the whole space. Now by definition,
‘completeness’ of a theory implies that every object predicted with certainty by the theory
must have a counterpart in physical reality [1]. Ergo, if we view OQM as a complete
theory, then we implicitly take the position that a quantum with a wave function ψ for
which ‖ψ‖ = 1 has a counterpart in physical reality—meaning that the quantum exists
even if it is not observed.
To get to the Berkelian Idealism, we must have a look at the postulates of OQM
that make statements about properties. Regarding properties that have more than one
possible value1, we then find the following corollary, which has earlier been hinted at by
Muller in [2]:
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Corollary 1. OQM entails a Berkelian idealism regarding properties (BIRP): absent
special preparations, a quantum ‘has’ a property X with quantitative value xj if and
only if a measurement of the property X has just been done with outcome xj.
Proof: This corollary follows from two postulates of OQM, the Standard Property
Postulate (SPP) and the Projection Postulate (PP):
Postulate 2. (SPP) a quantum ‘has’ a property X with quantitative value xj if and
only if it is in the eigenstate | xj 〉 of the associated operator Xˆ [3].2,3
Postulate 3. (PP) if a measurement of the property X has been done with outcome xj,
then immediately after the measurement the quantum is in the eigenstate | xj 〉 of the
associated operator Xˆ [4].
Obviously, the logical form of the SPP is that of a proposition of the type
P ↔ E (1)
with the proposition letters P and E denoting ‘a quantum has a property X with quan-
titative value xj’ and ‘the quantum is in the eigenstate | xj 〉 of the associated operator
Xˆ’, respectively. The PP, obviously, has the logical form of an implication
E ←M (2)
with the proposition letter M denoting ‘a measurement of the property X has just been
done with outcome xj’. In addition, the PP is the only postulate of OQM that tells
us how a quantum can get in the required eigenstate | xj 〉: it is, thus, ruled out that
the quantum is in the eigenstate | xj 〉 of the operator Xˆ without a measurement of the
property X having been done with outcome xj.
4 In other words, because the PP is the
only postulate of OQM that tells us how a quantum can get in the required eigenstate,
we have the additional proposition
¬(E ∧ ¬M) (3)
which is equivalent to
E →M (4)
Now expressions (2) and (4) yield
E ↔M (5)
From expressions (1) and (5) we get
P ↔M (6)
This expression (6) is precisely the BIRP. Ergo, OQM entails a BIRP. 
So on the one hand, the ‘only if’ part of the BIRP forbids to say that a quantum ‘has’
a certain quantitative property when that property hasn’t been measured (again, absent
special preparations). On the other hand, the ‘if’ part of the BIRP guarantees that the
quantum ‘has’ the property X with value x upon a measurement of that proprty X with
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outcome x. This BIRP reflects an essential aspect of the concept of a quantum, that of
course remains intact when we make relativistic corrections: these concern the measured
value of a property, but not the criterion for when a quantum does or doesn’t ‘have’ a
quantitative property.
This BIRP poses an issue for the development of a quantum theory of gravitation. An
important physical principle in this context is namely the principle of curvature as stated
by General Relativity (GR): space-time is curved due to the energy of objects (parti-
cles) as expressed by the Einstein field equations. The principle is backed up by empirical
evidence, but if we want to develop a quantum theory of gravity and we want to recon-
textualize this physical principle in the framework of quantum theory, then we stumble
on a problem. Namely, the space-time of GR is not a substance, not an object: the
fact that it has a metric doesn’t make it an object—it is the void between the objects.
That being said, it cannot be an individual in the quantum-theoretical ontology that
has a wave-function. So we cannot speak of a ‘metric operator’ gˆ: the metric is not an
observable property that a quantum ‘has’ (or can ‘have’). So on the one hand, space-
time is itself not a quantum object that is subjected to this BIRP: therefore, at any
spatiotemporal position (~x, t) space-time has a definite curvature regardless whether it is
measured or not5. But on the other hand, the quanta that populate the universe do not
‘have’ a definite energy (or gravitational mass), which is supposed to be the cause of that
curvature, unless the energy is measured: that the BIRP—so no measurement, no cause
of curvature. That’s the problem. See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
Figure 1: Illustration of the issue for quantum gravity. The picture shows a system of five quanta
at a given time t. Horizontally the spatial x−axis, vertically the spatial y−axis; the z−axis is suppressed.
The blurred spots represent the probability distributions of the quanta, with a darker tint indicating a
higher probability of being found at that position. So at the spatiotemporal position indicated by the
black dot, space-time does have the property curvature with a definite value G regardless whether we
make a measurement or not. But without measurement, the quanta do not ‘have’ a definite energy,
which is supposed to be the cause of that curvature. Therefore, the principle of curvature cannot be
recontextualized in the framework of OQM.
Of course, one can approach the problem purely pragmatically and develop an equation
by which the curvature emerges, for example, from expectation values of momenta of the
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quanta as expressed by this equation:
Gµν = T (〈p〉1, 〈p〉2, 〈p〉3, . . .)µν (7)
This equation is mathematically well-defined, so one might be inclined to think that this
solves the problem. However, the expectation values 〈p〉j refer to expected outcomes of
experiments: these are not properties that the quanta ‘have’ in absence of measurement.
So this “solution” would be conceptually incoherent: it is not a solution at all.
The main conclusion from the foregoing is that the principle of curvature of GR is fun-
damentally incompatible with any quantum framework implying the Berkelian idealism
regarding properties. This incompatibility comes on top of inconsistencies between GR
and quantum theory that have already been identified, see e.g. [7] for an overview. But
the present incompatibility is at the conceptual level, meaning that it cannot be resolved
by altering calculational procedures or changing mathematical representations of the con-
cepts: either the view on space-time of GR is false, or the orthodox notion of a quantum
is false, or both are false.
Given that the principle of curvature is a relation between things as basic as length,
mass, and time, on can take the position that is a fundamental physical principle. From
that point of view, the present reasoning yields a modus tollens kind of argument against
quantum theory: we have seen that the BIRP doesn’t work for the principle of curvature,
so from a pragmatic point of view the BIRP cannot be true; so if we then have a quantum
framework that implies this BIRP, then we are forced to conclude that this framework
isn’t true either.
On the other hand, if one does want to develop a quantum theory of gravity, then
there is no other option to take the position that the world view of GR emerges from
something more fundamental. But the question is then: what is more fundamental than
things like mass, length, and time? The only possibility seems to be to take a substantival
approach to space-time, thus reviving the idea of an aether.
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Furthermore, the idea to give the name ‘Berkelian idealism regarding properties’ to the
if-and-only-if statement in Cor. 1 emerged from a discussion with F.A. Muller (Erasmus
University Rotterdam) about his unpublished work [2], in which he suggests to describe
the relation between OQM and Berkeley’s idealism.
Notes
1E.g. if we measure the position of an electron, the obtained value is one out of a range of possibilities.
2The use of operators as representations of observable properties has been criticized in [5]; however,
this note is about OQM, so with observable properties represented by operators.
3The SPP, in particular the “only if” part, has been criticized [6]. However, the SPP as formulated
is essential to OQM: if we remove the “only if” part then we depart from the framework of OQM. This
note is about OQM, so with the SPP as stated.
4Some quantum physicists have asserted that in certain cases a quantum that is in a superposition
of eigenstates can get into an eigenstate by temporal evolution: these special cases are excluded by the
condition ‘absent special preparations’ in Cor. 1.
5The fact that space-time has a definite metric on it at every spatiotemporal position doesn’t make it
an ‘absolute’ space-time. For an observer O, the metric at (~x, t) is g, and for an observer O′, the metric
at (~x′, t′)—with (~x, t) and (~x′, t′) referring to the same event—is g′. But we not necessarily have g = g′,
so space-time is not absolute.
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